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Doll: Swift's Discourse

SWIFT'S DISCOURSE OF POLITICS AND POLITICS
OF DISCOURSE: DISENFRANCHISMENT THROUGH
DEFINITION
an Doll
University ofNew Orleans

In Some Thoughts on the Present State of Affairs May 1714,
written in his retirement at Letcombe Bassett after the break between
Harley and Bolingbroke, Jonathan Swift reflects upon his service as
propaganda master in the turbulent Harley ministry and offers a most
successful way to manage an argument: "In all Contests the safest Way
is to put those we dispute with, as much in the Wrong as we can.”1
One of the best ways to put them in the wrong to subvert their words
and thus destroy the
by destroying his words. The strategy of much
of Swift's prose to assert political control over his opponents by
asserting control over their language. He seeks to disenfranchise his
foes by denying them control over their own words. By continually
calling attention to what he deems their misuse of words and then
"correcting” those words, Swift establishes his political power. Swift
employs a number of rhetorical strategies to accomplish this
appropriation: he uses signal phrases like "under the Name” to suggest
a distance between word and thing; he treats his opponents' figurative
language as if it were literal and vice versa; and, most frequently, he
defines or redefines a key word in his own or his foes' argument.
many of his works revolve around a definition or redefinition of
a specific word like "Protestant,” "Moderate,” or "Subjection,” and
demonstrate the abuses of religion and politics wrought by his
opponent's misuse of that word. The opening sentence of On the
Testimony of Conscience offers a typical example: "There is no Word
more frequently in the Mouths of Men, titan that of Conscience, and the
Meaning of it in some Measure generally understood: However,,,it
is likewise a Word extreamly abused by many People, who apply other
Meanings to it, which God Almighty never intended” (9: 150), He
then provides his own definition in order to reassert the proper wordthing relationship
consequently to reassert the proper religious and
political behavior. What is at stake in such definitions and redefinitions
power, control of language as control of political power and control
of political power as control of language.
this use of definition for
polemical purposes, we see one of the great paradoxes of Swift's work:
he is desperately afraid of the consequences of the abuse of he word
thing relationship, but at the same time he faces the need to get
political work done and recognizes that to do so he must use what he
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sees as his foes’ own methods. He demonstrates brilliance in
manipulating language, often in the very process of censuring others for
exactly the
abuse.
Two purposes underlie Swift’s use of definition: lexical purity and
polemical effectiveness. As for the first, the same impulse that leads
Swift to write A Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining
the English Tongue causes
to define as a way of “fixing” words by
specifying the word-thing relationship at least in this place at this
Although the preponderance of Swift’s definitions are polemical, a few
are straightforward attempts to assert lexical
Of the few nonpolemical examples, most define legal, technical, or other “hard” words.
Another class of relatively non-polemical definitions contains Swift’s
pronouncements on the “proper” meaning of common words, the most
well-known of which is “Proper Words in Proper Places, makes the true
Definition of Stile” (9: 65). These few pronouncements invariably
refer to some form of social behavior or taste rather than to partisan
politics, although the two are never entirely separate in Swift’s world.
In these instances Swift deploys his definitions as a base from which to
lecture upon “proper” behavior; such lectures are indeed a kind of
argument but these arguments certainly depend less upon an aggressive
manipulation of language than his political arguments. For example,
Swift opens On Good-Manners and Good-Breeding with the definition,
“Good-Manners is the Art of making those People easy with whom we
converse” (4:
and a little later adds a definition on the obverse of
good manners: “Pedantry is properly the overrating any Kind of
Knowledge we pretend to” (4: 215). After these definitions Swift
explains what kinds of behavior fall under each term, and in doing so he
is indeed arguing. At the same time, however, the control of these
specific words—“good-manners” and “pedantry”—is not the central
purpose of the definitions or the essay, nor is he attacking or
“Correcting” an opponent’s use of these words.
Swift’s careful attention to definition in an attempt to “fix” the
word-thing relationship in the interest of lexical correctness is, of
course, not unique: indeed, a careful definition of
and terms is a
central tenet of virtually every post-Baconian philosopher, including
Hobbes and Locke. One of the main aims of these philosophers to
avoid the linguistic hairsplitting and “tedious disputes over words” of
the Schoolmen, and definition is usually seen as the first and best
defense. Bacon claims, “It is almost necessary, in all controversies and
disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting
down in the very beginning the definition of our words and terms, that
others may know
we accept and understand them, and whether they
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concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we
are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in
questions and differences about words.”2 Hobbes also calls for strict,
formal definitions
the foundation of philosophy: “The light of
human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first
snuffed, and purged from ambiguity.”3 One of the achievements Sprat
boasts of in his History of
Royal Society is how the members have
reformed the abuses of the Schoolmen by replacing the Schoolmen’s
words with “things” secured by experimentation and careful definition.
Swift agrees wholeheartedly with this refutation, as evidenced, for
instance, by his treatment of Scotus and other Schoolmen as dunces and
frauds in the episodes on Glubbdubdrib, the Island of Sorcerers, in Book
III of Gulliver’s Travels, and he agrees with the goal of a one word-one
thing relationship. His difference, however, is that while he sees
definition as one way to achieve this goal, he does not agree that it
the only way nor that there is only one way of defining as Hobbes and
Locke have it. Swift accomplishes his definitions not primarily
through the rigorous, formal, mathematical definitions of the logicians
and philosophers, but rather through a variety of informal definitions
and rhetorical devices. Also unlike Hobbes, Locke, and most of his
predecessors, Swift is much more likely to apply definition to the
words of others than to his own.
Throughout his Essay Locke does indeed purge the words he
intends to use of their earlier accretions; as he announces
purpose of
his work in “The Epistle to the Reader,” “It is ambition enough to be
employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and
removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge.”4
Accumulated misdefinitions are a part of the rubbish he clearing. For
example, in his definition of man” Locke claims, “I think that to one
who desired to know what Idea the word Man stood for; if it should be
said, that Man was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense,
spontaneous Motion, and
Faculty of Reasoning, I doubt not but the
meaning of the term Man, would be as well understood, and the Idea it
stands for be at least clearly made known,
it is defined to be
a rational Animal...,I have in explaining the term Man, followed here
the ordinary Definition of the Schools.”5 But while Locke
builds
upon the ground he has cleared, Swift is far more interested in
appropriating the ground he clearing or at least in scorching the
ground to deny it to the opposition. Sometimes he simply wishes to
reconnect the original “correct” thing with the correct word, but far
more often his redefinitions serve as the preface and opening sally in
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some argument; he will not only “clear the ground,” as Locke would
have it, but will also advance a considerable way over it under the cover
of definition or redefinition. In the
Drapier’s Letter Swift attacks
the claim that Ireland is “a depending Kingdom” by objecting to this
phrase as “a modern Term of Art” repudiating what his opposition
means by it “that the People of Ireland is in some State of Slavery or
Dependence, different from those of England,” and redefines the
“dependence” the loyalty and legal obligations both nations owe the
King (10: 62). Swift advances more than lexical propriety here; rather
he reiterates one of the major tenets in his argument against Wood’s
halfpence: the English Parliament has no legal right to legislate for
Ireland, in this case as to what is or is not legal
If Swift’s reader
accepts the premise that appears as a redefinition, he will have to accept
Swift’s conclusion about the halfpence.
At times Swift offers his definition in the form of a Trojan horse—
something which appears to be neutral but which in fact contains his
strongest forces or arguments. The Examiner, in particular, often
protests his neutrality in political issues and purports to “examine”
current events with an unbiased perspective, only to employ definitions
of crucial words in order to argue pointedly for the Harley ministry’s
position under cover of this neutrality. Similarly, in the first Drapier' s
Letter Swift employs a Trojan horse tactic in his definition of “Lawful
Money,” “Half-Penny,” and “Farthing” in order to refute Wood’s
halfpence. Under the appearance of explaining the terminology of
English law concerning coinage, the Drapier says, “By the Laws of
England, the several Metals are divided into Lawful or true Metal and
unlawful or false Metals the Former comprehends Silver or Gold, the
Latter all Baser Metals” (10: 8). He reiterates his definition by citing a
later law which “shews that by the Words Half-Penny and Farthing of
Lawful Money in that Statute concerning the passing of Pence,
meant a small Coin in Half-pence and Fartlungs of Silver” (10: 10). If
Swift’s opponent accepts his definitions, he must logically accept
Swift’s conclusion that Wood’s brass halfpence are not legal currency;
the argument is thus lost before it has even begun. Here Swift, as the
Drapier, adopts the guise of an unlearned man simply seeking to
explain difficult legal language in terms more comprehensible to his
audience, but underneath the apparently neutral definition lurks one of
Swift’s central arguments against Wood’s patent
Most often, however, the battle with and for words is more nakedly
conducted. In Some Remarks Upon A Letter to Seven Lords, for
example, Swift quibbles with the expression of the writer he is
answering and replies, “As for the Head that has done the greatest
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Mischief to the Kingdom, I cannot consent it should fall, untill he and I
have settled the Meaning of the Word Mischief" (3: 196). Words are
the central weapons in such battles, and there is no pretense of
impartiality or disinterestedness. This battle over words and their
definitions occurs throughout the political works especially; most often
Swift defines a controversial word or phrase in a government document
he defends or attacks. So, for example, in The Conduct of the Allies,
Swift defines the phrase “the whole Strength of the Nation” from the
Grand Alliance treaty to mean the strength of the King’ revenues but
not also everything he can mortgage or borrow (6: 18). Through this
definition Swift justifies the Harley ministry’ decision not to increase
supplies for the war; in doing so, he explicitly refutes the Whig
definition of the phrase and thereby refutes their war policy. The side
that wins the contest of definitions, in this case Swift’ side and Swift’s
definitions, wins the support of the populace.
Of course while he worked for Harley’s Tory administration, Swift
always claimed that he himself was a Whig—an “old Whig” rather than
a follower of the speculators and stock-jobbers the party had become—
in matters of governance such as in support for a constitutional
monarchy. Swift argued repeatedly that he had not changed, but the two
parties had. This conflict between Whig and Tory (or old Whig)
definitions of the same words is continually re-enacted in Swift’s
works. One of the clearest examples is the battle over the definition of
“Wealth of the Nation”: in Examiner 13 Swift bemoans the corruption
that “the Wealth of the Nation, that used to be reckoned by the Value of
Land, is now computed by the Rise and Fa of Stocks” (3: 13). Over
and over Swift argues that the landowners are the only proper judges of
what is right for the nation, and he constantly scorns or satirizes the
“Stock-jobbers and moneyed-men.” The same argument recurs in
another definition in the sixth Drapier’s Letter: “I take the proper
Definition of Law to be
Will of the Majority of those who have
Property in Land" (10: 134). In consonance with the Tory view, Swift
insists that the landowners are the truest citizens and the rightful
possessors of legal and political power. The issue in these definitions
is not primarily lexical correctness (although one of the corruptions
Swift invariably charges his opponents with is misuse of language);
rather the fundamental principles of government are being argued
through the medium of these definitions. The fact that the Whigs still
hold or have just held much of the political and economic power of
England is what enables them to control the language; now that the
Tories are newly in power (this is Swift’s first Examiner), the “thing”
can only be corrected after
word is corrected. Swift’s contribution to
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the new Tory government is that while Harley’s ministry corrects the
previous Whig administration’s policies, Swift corrects their words.
This is the purpose of The Examiner's definitions.
Another variation of employing definition for argumentative
purposes to which Swift frequently resorts is defining or rather
misdefining the words of his opponents. In many works in which he
directly or indirectly
the language of
he often “explains”
their words by putting the least charitable interpretation possible upon
them, or distorting them altogether, and then claiming that the resultant
definition is theirs rather than his. Martin Price argues that this is a
“constant” trick of Swift’s: because the power of words depends on
association, Swift changes those associations subtly and subverts his
foes’ terms.6 Very often, however, the subversion is not at all subtle.
In Examiner 40, for example, Swift says of the Whigs and one of their
key terms, “A Revolution-Principle, as their Writings and Discourses
have taught us to define it, a Principle perpetually disposing Men to
Revolutions” (3: 147); here Swift reverses the frequent Whig claim
that they are the party that accomplished and supported the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and the party that safeguards the Act of Settlement,
guaranteeing the succussion of the Hanoverians. He employs a (mis-)
definition
Whig would agree to in order to charge the Whigs with
sympathies for the Pretender, and at
same time he claims that this is
the Whig definition rather than his own. Another way he accomplishes
this shift is to impersonate his opponent and have that opponent restate
or redefine his own words in a more “honest” and less attractive way.
In A Letter of Thanks from My Lord Wharton to Bishop Asaph,
“Wharton” first refers to “Such a Peace, as would have answer'd all our
Prayers,” then restates the same phrase to the more mercenary “When
the Dutch could get nothing by the War, nor we Whigs lose anything
by a Peace,” and finally restates it in baser and even more mercenary
terms: “When we had exhausted all the Nation’s Treasure.. .and so far
enrich’d ourselves, and beggar’d our Fellow-Subjects, as to bring them
under a Necessity of submitting to what Conditions we should think fit
to impose” (6: 154). Swift’s impersonation of Wharton here is part of
his campaign to justify the Tory-negotiated peace with France by
accusing Whig leaders, especially Wharton and the Duke of
Marlborough, of prolonging the war out of personal greed.
A final example of a misdefinition “corrected” by an argument
masquerading as a redefinition involves one of the more controversial
terms of
age—“passive obedience.” In The Sentiments of a Churchof-England Man Swift cites a misdefinition of passive obedience that
began in the early seventeenth century: “The Clergy of the two Reigns
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before the Revolution...under the Terms of Passive Obedience, and
Non-Resistance, are said to have preached up the unlimited Power of the
Prince” (2: 16). He follows this misdefinition with a careful
redefinition espousing the Tory or old Whig view that, according to the
original and correct sense of the word, obedience is due to the whole
balanced government including the Commons and Lords, and not only
the King. The results of this misdefinition are wide-ranging and
profound: Swift calls this mistake “the Foundation of all the political
Mistakes” in Hobbes’ Leviathan, a book which has done enough
damage to church and state
16). More seriously, this
misunderstanding of the term passive obedience has led to a slavish
dependency on the King from the clergy and their congregations, and
this dependency has in some ways contributed to the need for the
Revolution of 1688. In The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man
(1708) Swift’s purpose is generally to explain and defend the position
of a moderate churchman aligned with neither party, and thus this
misdefinition-redefinition serves little further argumentative purpose.
But by the time he writes Examiner 33 in March, 1710, Swift much
more fully committed politically, and
exposure of the misdefinition
and his redefinition of “passive obedience” have a clearer partisan
political purpose. Swift introduces his redefinition in order to refute the
charges of “Arbitrary Power,
and Popery” that the Whigs hurl
at the Tories. He announces as the purpose of Examiner 33, “I will
therefore give two Descriptions of Passive Obedience;
first, as it is
falsely charged by the Whigs; the other, as it is really professed by the
Tories” (3: 112). The opening of each definition provides a fair sense
of Swift’s slant: the “Whig” definition begins, “The Doctrine of
Passive Obedience
to believe, that a King, even in a limited
Monarchy, holding his Power only from God, is only answerable to
him. That, such a King is above all Law; that the cruellest Tyrant
must be submitted to in all Things; and if his Commands be ever so
unlawful, you must neither fly nor resist, nor use any other Weapons
than Prayers and
” (3: 112). Opposed to this is the “correct” Tory
definition: “They think that in every Government, whether Monarchy
or Republick, there is placed a supream, absolute, unlimited Power, to
which Passive Obedience is due....That, among us, as every Body
knows, this Power is lodged in the King or Queen, together with the
Lords and Commons of the Kingdom” (3: 113). Clearly Swift intends
to throw the Whig accusation right back upon them. This redefinition
in effect denies to the Whigs the “Revolution Principles” each party
strives so hard to claim. Usually the Whigs proclaim most proudly
their part in the Revolution, but if Swift’s redefinition is accepted the
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Whigs can only be seen as having opposed the Revolution. They must
also logically be the current supporters of the Pretender, since James
the monarch to whom they owe absolute “passive obedience.” Again
the ostensible reason for Swift’s redefinition (and indeed the often-stated
purpose of The Examiner itself) is to set the record straight, but this
Whig misdefinition-Tory redefinition in fact serves the advancement of
an argument rather than lexical accuracy, indeed, at the cost of lexical
accuracy.
After his (mis-)definitions Swift frequently makes the ingenuous
claim that his is the only possible interpretation; by their tone and,
indeed, by their very presence such protests are generally a very clear
signal that Swift is well aware he is twisting his opponents’ words
back on them. In the fourth Drapier’s Letter Swift answers
letters
published in London newspapers that he claims were directed, if not
written, by Wood in order to attack the Drapier and the refusal of the
Irish to accept Wood’ halfpence. Swift plays with some of the phrases
from these letters and offers just
a (mis-)definition and protest:
“They are going to Shake off their Dependence upon the Crown of
England; that is to say, they are going to chuse another King: For
there can be no other Meaning in this Expression, however some may
pretend to strain it” (10: 61). Swift’s misinterpretation again serves a
political purpose: Wood’s expression refers to the controversy over the
legal right of the English Parliament to make laws for Ireland, but
Swift deliberately exaggerates and misdefines Wood’s words in order to
accuse Wood of “Slander” when actually it is Swift who slanders Wood.
By protesting against other interpretations of these words, Swift
indicates their very presence and, in fact, calls attention to them. Swift
then employs this misdefinition as a preface to his own definition of “a
depending Kingdom,”
once again
his
argument that
the English Parliament alone cannot make laws for Ireland alone.
Swift does fight to keep words politically correct, but he is far
more often forced to “destroy” them. This is perhaps because of the
generally losing position the Tories held during the early eighteenth
century: Swift enjoyed a few brief years during the Tories’ political
control and produced official Tory documents like The Conduct of the
Allies which set the linguistic and political record straight, but even
most of this short period was spent fending off Whig encroachments on
Tory power. Most of his career, however, he wrote in opposition to
Whig governments solidly in power. A second reason Swift spent
more time attacking the language of his opponents is that his concern
for the use of words is habitually far more often a concern for their
misuse, whether politically motivated or
In his various writings
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about language, his many satires of the misuse of language (A Tale of a
Tub, Argument Against Abolishing Christianity, Tatler 230), and his
various rhetorical strategies designed to guard language, Swift offers far
more criticisms than answers. Speaking in particular about the Irish
tracts and the Drapier's Letters, Edward Said argues that this is Swift’s
great skill: His element was language, as was the enemy’s, but far
more than anyone he was able to exploit the negative aspects of the
medium: its airiness, its impermanence, its potential for solipsistic
debasement.”7
What Irvin Ehrenpreis says of Swift’s sermons might well be
extended to the rest of his prose: “His obsession with correctness of
language led him to practice definition and redefinition part of his
rhetoric.”8 This obsession manifests itself throughout Swift’s work,
from the overt prescriptions like the Proposal to the wildest satires of
language abuse in the
and definition in all forms and rhetorical
techniques plays a central role in the pursuit of this correctness. There
is, however, more to Swift’s use of definition than its power to correct
the word-thing relationship. What Swift says sarcastically of Tindall’s
work provides a fair final assessment of
own definitions: “The
Strength of his Arguments is equal to the Clearness of his Definitions”
(2: 81). In some definitions linguistic clarity is Swift’s primary goal,
but in his political arguments the “clarity” is perhaps evident only to
Tories. In Swift’s definitions it is more likely that the clarity of his
arguments equal to the strength of his definitions. Throughout his
prose, this disenfranchisement through definition is a central strategy of
Swift’s politics of discourse and discourse of politics.
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